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The monetary and 
real effects of the 
financial opening up 
of national 
economies to the 
exterior 
The case of Chile 1975-1978* 
Roberto Zahler** 
T h e object of this article is to describe and analyse 
certain aspects of Chilean short-term macroeconom-
ic policy which have not been sufficiently investi-
gated, placing special emphasis on the financial 
measures applied from the end of 1973, and more 
specifically from the first quarter of 1975, when the 
so-called Economic Recovery Programme began. 
The introduction to this paper is followed by a 
description of the initial situation with which the 
new macroeconomic policy had to deal. The second 
part analyses the problems facing the stabilization 
programme, as well as its characteristics and its 
achievements , recognizing from the outset that price 
stabilization was the priority objective of short-term 
macroeconomic policy in the period under study. In 
particular, a discussion is made of the links between 
the stabilization policy, on the one hand, and the 
external opening up, the evolution of demand for 
money, and movements in the exchange rate and in 
the interest rate, on the other. 
The third part analyses the implications of an 
external opening up occurring at a different rate and 
in a different manner in the real sector as compared 
with the financial sector of the economy, and studies 
the relations between exchange, monetary and cred-
it policies in a process of this type, as well as some of 
the effects it had on investment, employment, 
resource allocation and the process of concentration 
of wealth. Finally, the fourth part offers a summary of 
this study and its main conclusions, perhaps the 
most important and controversial of which is that the 
macroeconomic policy applied was not neutral vis-à-
üis the sectors and groups which had to bear the cost 
of the stabilization policy and the redistributive 
effects arising from the way in which the external 
financial opening up was brought into effect. 
*An earlier version of this paper (E/CEPAL/PROY.4/R.1) 
was presented at the Sixteenth Meeting of Technicians of 
Central Banks of the American Continent, which was held 
in San José, Costa Rica, from 25 to 30 November 1979. 
**Expert working for the UNDP/CEPAL Joint Project on 
"Implications for Latin America of the situation of the in-
ternational monetary and financial system" (RLA/77/021). 
Introduction* 
Several countries in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America have in recent years experi-
enced fairly similar economic and social cir-
cumstances, involving political and institu-
tional breaks with the past of varying degrees of 
abruptness, partly as a result of a very complex 
economic situation marked by inadequate eco-
nomic growth, a high rate of inflation, balance-
of-payments difficulties, extensive price con-
trols, the existence of large black markets and a 
drop in output. 
In each case the new authorities attributed 
this situation to the development strategy 
based on industrialization through import 
substitution, and to the effect of the numerous 
'distortions' which affected the price system. 
In these circumstances, in the light of this 
interpretation and in the context of a new 
political order, economic policies seeking 
'normalization' were introduced with the aim 
of laying the foundations of a different style of 
development, guided by a strategy very dif-
ferent from that followed over the past thirty 
years. 
The new strategy emphasizes opening up 
to the exterior, the free functioning of markets 
and the stimulation of private initiative; it 
assigns a 'subsidiary' role to the State, and 
places emphasis on reducing the government 
deficit and public expenditure, controlling the 
means of payment, and ensuring price stability. 
The principal features of the short-term 
economic policy have been an endeavour to 
reduce the existing macroeconomic imbal-
ances and the allocation of priority —in view of 
the initial situation— to control inflation and 
improvement of the balance of payments, as 
well as external creditworthiness. 
The above describes more or less what 
happened in Argentina, starting in March 1976, 
in Chile, starting in September 1973 and in 
Uruguay, starting in September 1974. 
"The author wishes to express appreciation for the com-
ments made by Félix Bacigalupo, Tomás Baliño, Andrés 
Bianchi, Robert Devlin, Gunther Held, Ricardo Ffrench-
Davis, Carlos Massad and Andrés Sanfuentes, as well as 
those made a tan internal CEPAL seminar. Thanks are also 
due for assistance provided by Eugenio Alviz and Tatjana 
Montes. Responsibility for any errors which still remain is 
of course my own. 
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However, there were also some substantial 
differences, arising partly from the initial situa-
tion from which the experiments evolved, and 
from certain structural characteristics specific 
to each of these countries. Particular mention 
may be made in this respect of political and 
institutional features; those related to the type 
of export market; the degree to which produc-
tive activity was in private or State hands; the 
speed and completeness with which the eco-
nomies were opened up to external forces (as 
regards both real and financial aspects); the 
predominance of certain economic policy ob-
jectives over others (for example, full employ-
ment versus price stability); and the approach 
used and degree of independence and con-
sistency achieved by the technical teams in 
handling economic affairs. 
To a degree, this study falls within a 
context established by two relatively new 
global phenomena, one in the international 
economic field and the other in the application 
of economic policies by some developing 
countries. 
On the one hand there is the growth in 
international liquidity and the increasing im-
portance of the international private banks in 
the recent period, as a result of which private 
financial credits have been growing in impor-
tance in comparison with official external 
financing, and are beginning to replace direct 
foreign investment as the main mechanism 
whereby capital is exchanged between the 
Between 1971 and 1973 an attempt was made to 
modify profoundly the distribution of income 
and wealth in the country. In the long term 
this implied an alteration of the structure of 
production, of the mode of operation of the 
economy and, more broadly, of the type of 
relations predominating in Chilean society up 
to that time. As far as economic aspects were 
concerned, this involved an intensification of 
the process of agrarian reform and the establish-
industrialized countries and the countries at an 
intermediate stage of development. The 
emergence of these new characteristics on the 
international financial scene makes it necessa-
ry to highlight, in relation to the past, the 
specifically economic determinants of supply 
and demand for external financial resources. 
From the viewpoint of the development 
strategy and economic policy applied by 
various Latin American countries, especially in 
the Southern Cone, there is a definite tendency 
towards external economic opening up. As far 
as the opening up of trade is concerned, this has 
attracted a good deal of attention in profes-
sional and academic circles. However, there is 
a lack of studies on the external financial 
opening up proper, and also on its implications 
for the efficiency of monetary and credit poli-
cies and its repercussions on the evolution of 
domestic prices, the external debt, employ-
ment, investment and redistribution of wealth 
arising from differences in timing or in speed 
between commercial opening up and financial 
opening up. 
In view of the fact that these events are 
very recent, that information is relatively 
scarce and that a_ comparative analysis of the 
three cases goes beyond the planned scope of 
the present study, and also because of the 
author's greater knowledge of the Chilean case, 
Chile has been selected as the subject of this 
study. 
ment of an area of social ownership in the 
spheres of production, finance and marketing. 
The economic programme drawn up at that 
time did not pay due attention to the manage-
ment of financial variables, but concentrated 
on an attemp to control the concrete aspects of 
the process of production and distribution. 
Because of this, the short-term macroeconomic 
policy produced such results, at least in some 
respects, that towards the end of 1973 Chile 
I 
The initial situation 
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was facing an economic situation characterized 
by numerous severe imbalances, both in the 
fiscal and monetary sectors and in the balance 
of payments. 
The creation of the area of social owner-
ship and the prices policy applied in it, 
together with the increasing gap between 
government expenditure and tax revenues, led 
to a marked increase in the fiscal deficit. While 
in the decade 1960-1969 the deficit repre-
sented on average 14.6% of expenditure in the 
sector and 3.3% of gross domestic product 
expenditure, the corresponding values in the 
period 1970-1973 were 35.5% and 12.5%. In 
1973, the fiscal deficit was equivalent to 55.1% 
of fiscal expenditure and 23.6% of gross do-
mestic product expenditure (see table 1). In 
real terms the fiscal deficit in 1973 was seven 
times as large as in the decade 1960-1969, 
while fiscal expenditure as a proportion of 
gross domestic product expenditure stood at 
double its recent historical share. 
Table 1 
CHILE: FISCAL DEFICIT, 1960-1978 
(Per cent) 































Source: Ministry of Finance, Budget Department, Exposición sobre el estado de la hacienda pública, Santiago, Chile, 
January 1979. 
Developments in the monetary sector also 
showed signs of severe imbalances. Whereas in 
1960-1969 the average growth rate of private 
money (M| ) was 37% a year, this figure rose 
fivefold in 1970-1973, and in 1973 growth in 
M y was 419%. There is no doubt that, in the 
face of this growth rate in the means of 
payment, 'monetary' causes were important in 
explaining the inflationary process which the 
country was experiencing; inflation reached 
levels unprecedent in the economic history of 
Chile. In the period 1970-1973, annual average 
growth in the Consumer Price Index was 
117%,' and it reached a rate equivalent to 355% 
in September 1973, revealing a very serious 
state of affairs not only because of the very high 
rates of inflation, but also because inflation did 
not appear to b e under control. In the period 
1960-1969, in contrast, the average annual rate 
of inflation was 25% (see table 2). 
1 Calculated on the basis of the Price Index prepared by 
the Depar tment of Economics of the University of Chile. 
Table 2 
CHILE: MONEY AND PRICES, 1966-1973 
(Percentage change? 


















Sources: Central Bank, Boletín mensual, various issues, 
and "Series Monetarias", July 1979. University 
of Chile, Department of Economics, "Indice de 
Precios al Consumidor", 1970-1976. 
a December to December. 
b Consumer Price Index: 1966-1970 — National Statistical 
Institute (INE), 1971-1973— University of Chile, Depart-
ment of Economics. 
"^Adjusted issue (figures of the Central Bank Of Chile).* 
Private sector money (figures of the Central Bank of 
Chile). 
T h i s is the recorded issue by the private and banking 
sector, adjusted for various non-monetary items in the 
Central Bank Balance. See University of Chile, Depart-
ment of Economics, Estadísticas monetarias de Chile 
1940-1975, Publication No. 70, Santiago, June 1979, pp. 
37-42. 
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The country's external position, the level 
of international reserves and capacity to secure 
external loans had also sharply worsened.2 As 
can be seen from table 3, both the trade balance 
and the current account balance deteriorated in 
1970-1973 compared with the average for the 
1960s. By the end of 1973 the level of net 
international reserves was negative to the 
extent of US$ 231 million, compared with a 
It would seem necessary to make a distinction 
between the actual and potential difficulty of obtaining 
external loans and the ability to disburse them, In fact, as 
the figures indicate, external financing was used fairly 
easily. 
positive balance of US$ 409 million in Decem-
ber 1970. 
Of course, the situation described above 
was at least partly due to, and was aggravated 
by, the mode of operation of the foreign 
exchange, financial and monetary markets, and 
even the market for real goods and services. 
The functioning of the foreign exchange 
market was characterized by the existence of 
multiple undervalued exchange rates, prior 
import deposits, para-tariff restrictions, import 
bans and other quantitative limitations. 
The financial sector, for its part, operated 
with interest rates held at excessively low 
levels, high and differential reserve ratios, 
Table 3 
CHILE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Exports of goods 
Imports of goods 
Trade balance" 
Current account balance 
Balance of non-compensa-
tory capital 
Balance of payments 
Net international reserves 
(average for the period 
on the basis of end-
of-year figures) 
Exports of goods 
Exports of goods (excluding 
copper) and services 
Imports of goods 
Trade balance11 
Current account balance 
Balance of non-compensa-
tory capital 
Balance of payments 
Net international reserves 
(average for the period 
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0.7 -3.4 -3.3 -6.9 1.1 -1.0 4.5 
Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Boletín mensual, December 1976 and May 1979. Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Department, Exposición sobre el estado de la hacienda pública, January 1979. 
"Defined as exports of goods less imports of goods. 
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qualitative and selective control of bank credit, 
and so on. Moreover, the Central Bank offered 
no resistance to the demands of the govern-
ment sector and State-owned enterprises, and 
thus helped to accentuate inflationary pres-
sures. 
To this should be added the profusion of 
price controls in the market for real goods and 
services, with the resulting effects on the 
allocation of resources and the general ef-
ficiency of the economic system, and on the 
•emergence of parallel (black) markets. 
Although the unemployment rate stood 
below its historical levels (to a large extent 
because of the rise in employment in the public 
sector and the area of public ownership), the 
share of gross domestic fixed capital invest-
ment in the gross domestic product expen-
diture in the period 1971-1973 was 20% lower 
than in the 1960s. Furthermore, after a growth 
of 7.7% in gross domestic product expenditure 
in 1971, it fell to 0 .1% in 1972 and 3.6% in 1973. 
In view of the circumstances described 
above, the new authorities set themselves the 
short-term aim of re-establishing macroeco-
nomic equilibrium, particularly in the financial 
field. 
As a longer-term strategy, the new regime 
has endeavoured to build up an economy based 
on the use of the free price system as a 
mechanism for resource allocation,3 the pro-
gressive reduction of the State's role in the 
economy and the attribution of a 'subsidiary' 
role to the State, which must act in such a way 
as to cause the least possible distortion in the 
operation of the markets. 
Repeated stress has been laid on the need 
to control inflation and to open up the economy 
to the exterior. Measures to combat inflation 
have principally been justified on the grounds 
of their impact on the transparency and stabili-
ty of the price system, and accordingly on the 
allocation of resources. The need to open up 
the economy has been explained in terms of the 
3 T h e most notable exceptions have been the labour 
and foreign exchange markets, where prices have been 
determined by mechanisms other than the free play of the 
market. Furthermore, the prices of a small number of goods 
have been controlled, though apparently at levels very 
close to those prevailing in the market. 
size of the international market and the effect of 
such a step on the competitiveness and ef-
ficiency of the Chilean economy. 
Consequently, the policies which most 
merit analysis here —though they were not 
necessarily applied at the same time, despite 
the fact that their introduction became fairly 
systematic4 from the beginning of 1975 on-
wards— were the following: 
(a) Efforts to control the inflation process 
by reducing the growth rate of the means of 
payment and currency issue; 
(b) Reduction in the size of the State 
apparatus, government expenditure and the 
fiscal deficit, and transfer by the State to the 
private sector of all those activities (including, 
of course, productive activities) which the 
authorities felt that the private sector could 
carry out efficiently; 
(c) Opening up the country to the exterior, 
especially as regards trade in goods and non-
financial services, by simplifying and reducing 
rules applying to external trade, progressively 
lowering and standardizing tariffs and, where 
possible, eliminating all allocation criterion 
other than the price of foreign exchange; 
(d) Unification and forward planning of the 
nominal exchange rate on the basis of two 
criteria: the differential between the Chilean 
and the United States inflation rates, and the 
evolution of the international reserves of the 
monetary system; 
(e) Liberalization and development of the 
domestic financial sector, with the criteria of 
profitability of assets and liabilities of the 
financial system, and competition between its 
institutions and intermediaries, becoming the 
guides for decision-making and action by eco-
nomic agents. Interest rates would be allowed 
to move freely, and legal reserve requirements 
would be reduced and standardized in ac-
cordance with general economic policy; 
4 It is not intended to assert that the economic policy 
has been applied in a manner displaying external and 
internal coherence and consistency. Nevertheless, despite 
various changes in emphasis and of priorities both as 
regards objectives and the means used (for example, 
inflation and external equilibrium, exchange rate policy, 
and so on), a basic long-term philosophy has predominated 
and has generally set the framework for the design of 
economic policy. 
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(f) A partial opening up to movements of 
international capital, principally controlled 
through the establishment of minimum repay-
T h e counter-inflation strategy was principally 
based on the effort to control the rate of growth 
of the monetary base and money (defined as 
Mi). This approach was based on the view of 
the new economic authorities that the magni-
tude of the Chilean inflationary process by the 
end of 1973 stemmed from monetary causes 
which could fundamentally be attributed to the 
deficit incurred by the public sector and the 
enterprises in the area of social ownership. 
This prompted a sharp restriction of credit 
from the monetary system to the government 
sector, which in 1975-1978 became responsible 
(as regards its budgetary situation in current 
terms) for a 'disissue' of currency, absorbing in 
that period 15% of the total issue of the Central 
Bank (see table 4). 
This is consistent with the official medi-
um-term and long-term views on the size and 
self-financing of the State sector and the need 
for a sharp reduction in the fiscal sector deficit 
(see table 1). In these circumstances, the public 
sector cut back its deficit by reducing expendi-
ture,5 increasing tax revenues,6 raising the 
tariffs of public enterprises and services and, 
though to a lesser extent, seeking to finance 
deficits by borrowing domestically from the 
private sector. 
Another important source of finance for the 
State was the sale of some of its assets; by 
December 1978 the Corporación de Fomento 
de la Producción had obtained the equivalent 
of US$ 585 million in this way. Naturally, this 
5 This was accompanied by changes in the breakdown 
of the expenditure. 
P r i n c i p a l l y through the introduction of a value added 
tax and strict measures against tax evasion. 
ment periods and restrictions on the capacity of 
the national banking system to borrow and to 
issue guarantees. 
source of income tends to vanish when the 
process of selling State assets has been com-
pleted. 
Table 4 
CHILE: VARIATIONS IN ADJUSTED 
CURRENCY ISSUE, 1974-1978 
Adjust- Exchange Domestic Treasury 
ed opera- credit and bond 
issue tionsa operations 
Absolute values 




















































Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Series monetarias, July 
1979; University of Chile, Department of Eco-
nomics, Estadísticas monetarias de Chile, 1940-
1975. 
i n c l u d i n g operations with the private sector and with the 
Treasury. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that de-
spite the appreciable effort of the public sector 
to accommodate itself to the requirements of 
the new economic policy, growth in the mone-
tary base up to the end of 1977 remained extra-
II 
The counter-inflation strategy within the 
macroeconomic policy 
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ordinarily high for what was termed a 'mone-
tarist' stabilization strategy. Only in 1977 did 
annual growth in the monetary base fall below 
the levels recorded in 1971-1973, and even 
then it remained excessively high, both in 
absolute terms and in comparison with the 
periods prior to 1970 (see table 5). 
Table 5 
CHILE; MONEY AND PRICES, 1966-1978 
Adjusted Private Con- Velocity 
issue sector sumer of circu-
money price lationa 
index (number 
of times 
(Percentage change from per year) 


































































Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Series Monetarias, op. 
cit.; Exposición sobre el estado de la hacienda 
pública, op. cit.; INE and Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Chile. 
"Defined as the gross domestic product expenditure di-
vided by Mi. These figures correspond to observed 
values, which are not necessarily the equilibrium values. 
bSource: Department of Economics, University of Chile. 
For the remainder of the period, the source is INE. 
Moreover, in spite of the efforts of the 
monetary authorities to control the means of 
payment, it took about live years7 to reduce 
inflation to levels close to, though higher than, 
historical levels.9 
7This happened at the end of 1978, though in 1979 
inflation revived. 
8 Nevertheless, it should be remembered that inter-
national inflation in the last five years has been much 
greater than that of the 1960s, so that in that regard the 
greater control recently observed over the pace of Chilean 
inflation is significant. 
In terms of the analytical framework in 
which the economic policy operated, this 
would seem to be due principally to the 
relative lack of sound instruments for monetary 
control,9 above all because of the embryonic 
nature of the long-term capital market, which 
prevented proper open^market operations. 
This was aggravated by the evolution of the 
velocity of circulation of money,10 basically as a 
result of the creation of very good substitutes 
for money and the persistence, for a consider-
able period of time, of high inflationary expec-
tations.11 
1. The counter-inflation policy and opening 
up to the exterior 
Since the difficulty in controlling currency 
issue lay principally in the exceptional inflow 
of foreign currency, which accounted for 80% 
of the cumulative change in the money base 
between 1975 and 1978, it would appear 
essential to analyse more thoroughly the re-
percussions of this change on a group of varia-
bles of key importance for the operation, 
balance and vigour of the economy. 
In the first place, it is worth recalling the 
well known fact that, if the exchange rate is 
fixed (in the sense that the Central Bank 
undertakes to buy and sell foreign exchange at 
a given, though not necessarily constant, price), 
then as an economy is opened up to external 
forces (either through the current account, the 
capital account, or both), domestic issue and 
money become increasingly endogenous12 vis-
à-vis the functioning of the economy. In this 
9 A phenomenon which occurs more clearly the more 
open the economy is to external forces. 
l0This refers to money as defined traditionally (M.), 
the growth rate of which was, for most of the period under 
consideration, regarded as an indicator and guide of 
monetary policy. 
11Furthermore, the fact that the economy had been 
'indexed', as well as other elements associated with cost 
pressures, helped to prevent the inflation rate from falling 
more rapidly. 
12In the sense that they cannot be controlled by the 
monetary authority and that in contrast, demand for the 
means of payment (which depends on the behaviour of 
individuals, enterprises and banks both at home and 
abroad) "creates its own supply", basically through 
movements in the current and capital accounts of the 
balance of payments. 
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way the efforts of the authorities to control the 
nominal supply of money tend to be fruitless, 
and their field of action is limited to domestic 
credit. 
As is well known, the Chilean production 
sector was subjected in a rapid and escalating 
manner to external competition, as a result of 
the progressive reductions in tariffs (see table 
6)13 and the introduction of a single real 
Table 6 
CHILE: NOMINAL TARIFFS, 1973-1979 
(Percentage of CIF values) 
of adjustment 























































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
a There are a small number of exceptions to the maximum 
tariffs, the most important of which relates to motor cars. 
exchange rate which, despite these reductions, 
did not rise appreciably (see table 7). 
Although protection for some sectors 
which were previously subject to negative 
effective protection was increased, the average 
tariff was lowered and standardized, and quan-
titative restrictions of all kinds were minimized 
almost to the point of elimination. 
As a consequence of this opening up to 
foreign trade, attempts to control money supply 
1 3 The lower tariff protection was partially offset by a 
rise in transport costs during the period. 
tend, though not immediately, to be cancelled 
out by movements in the current account14 or 
the capital account of the balance of payments. 
In other words, changes in the level of inter-
national reserves result from imbalances in the 
monetary sector. 
The evolution of the capital account of the 
balance of payments, and in particular that of 
net inflows of foreign loans to the domestic 
private sector, especially since the end of 1977, 
have played a preponderant role in this regard. 
Although the external financial liberaliza-
tion took place more slowly than the liberaliza-
tion of the real sector of the economy, it came to 
form the main mechanism through which 
liquidity in the economy was increased. Part 
III below contains a more thorough discussion 
of the special stimulus given to private bor-
rowing abroad. Here we shall briefly analyse 
the important role played by such borrowing in 
slowing the decline in the growth of currency 
issue and thus causing the main burden of the 
stabilization programme to fall with excessive 
force on the public sector. 
In order to understand the role played by 
international movements of capital, it is neces-
sary to remember that during the first half of 
1975, determination of the interest rate in the 
domestic financial system was left to market 
forces. At the same time, steps were taken to 
ensure a sharp reduction in the previous con-
trol —both quantitative and qualitative— on 
bank credit, by stimulating competition within 
the financial system.15 However, because of the 
desire to control growth of the means of 
However, it should be mentioned that, according to 
the authorities, the commercial opening up had a twofold 
justification. As far as long-term development strategy 
was concerned, it would force domestic producers to face 
up to international competition, while in relation to the 
counter-inflation policy, although it would restrict the 
instruments for monetary control over domestic credit, it 
would, for a given exchange policy, impose a ceiling on 
the domestic prices of internationally tradable goods and 
services. 
1 5This paper does not analyse the situation within 
the financial sector as regards the greater or lesser com-
petitiveness, rules of the game, or equality of opportunity 
as between institutions and intermediaries, both domestic 
and foreign. In this regard see F. Berger, "La protección 
efectiva negativa a la industria monetaria y la política 
financiera extema de Chile", Cuadernos de Economía, 
No. 42 (August 1977), pp. 197-234. 
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Table 7 
CHILE: EVOLUTION O F T H E EXCHANGE RATE AND PRICES 
indexes (Average for 1974 = 100) 
Period 













































































































































Four th quarter 
Sources: Central Bank of Chile; National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
aThis column probably underestimates the actual real exchange rate, if one takes into account the diversification of 
Chilean foreign trade and the devaluation of the dollar against other industrial countries currencies. No calculations of 
the effective exchange rate are published in Chile. 
payment, high reserve ratios on deposits were 
maintained for a substantial period, and this 
he lped to create a marked difference between 
interest rates for borrowers and for lenders. 
As may be seen from table 8, from the 
second quarter of 1975 onwards extremely high 
real interest rates for borrowers existed side by 
side with rates to depositors which, while 
positive (especially from the second half of 
1976 onwards), were much lower than the 
lending rates. The principal explanation for 
this, as already noted, lies partly in the high 
reserve ratios and also in the cost of operations 
by intermediaries and the profits obtained by 
the financial system during the period under 
consideration.16 
16Another variable which would explain the high 
spread between rates to borrowers and rates to lenders 
would seem to be inflation, as a result of the tact that, as 
depositors received a positive real rate, part of the inflation 
tax would be paid by by borrowers, by paying high interest 
rates on loans. See R. McKinnon, "La intermediación 
financiera y el control monetario en Chile", Cuadernos 
de Economía, No. 43 (December 1977), pp. 31-32. 
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Table 9 provides data on actual domestic 
interest rates17 expressed in (nominal) dollars, 
in other words the pertinent rates which are 
comparable with international interest rates. 
Here it can be seen that, with the exception of 
1975, when the rate of devaluation of the peso 
was almost identical to the nominal bank 
interest rate to borrowers, real rates in the 
remainder of the period were extraordinarily 
high. 
The differential between the interest rates 
prevailing in Chile and those in the main 
international financial centres (which on 
various occasions have recorded negative rates 
in real dollars), together with the excess supply 
oí international liquidity in the industrialized 
countries, the improvement in the interna-
tional reserve position of the Chilean monetary 
system and Chile's creditworthiness, go a long 
way towards explaining the inflow of foreign 
exchange to the country during this period.18 
Mention must also be made of the stimulus 
given to demand for external liabilities on the 
part of residents, because of the types of 
controls affecting international capital move-
ments , which, for persons who had access to 
external finance, led to substantial monopo-
listic or quasi-monopolistic profits (see Part 
III).19 
As may be seen from table 10, in the four 
years be tween 1975 and 1978 net flows of 
private capital made up 74% of exchange 
operations and 58% of the cumulative issue 
dur ing that period. 
I t should be noted that, while the inflow 
of external credit, through its influence on the 
domestic capital market, helps to reduce the 
interest rate, this requires that there should be 
no simultaneous attempt to reduce the rate of 
17As in table 8, these rates correspond to observed 
values (as distinct from expected values) ot nominal 
interest rates, of the change in the level of prices and of 
the evolution in the nominal exchange rate. 
18This assertion relates to the monetary impact of the 
inflow of external financial capital obtained by the domes-
tic private sector. 
19This should not be interpreted to mean that the 
supply of external credit is perfectly horizontal, at the 
same level, for all potential users of such finance, but 
rather that the imperfections which characterize this 
market were exacerbated by inadequate State controls. 
Table 10 
C H I L E : N E T FLOW OF PRIVATE EXTERNAL 
CAPITAL AND CURRENCY ISSUE 
(1) (2) (3) 
Cur- Ex- Net (3):(2) (3):(1) 
rency change inflow8 (Per- (Per-
issue opera- of cent- cent-
tions private age) age) 
capital 
(Annual flows in millions 
of US dollars) 
1975 639 476 236 50 37 
1976 844 731 254 35 30 
1977 665 346 267 77 40 
1978 523 529 783 148 150 
1975-1978 2 671 2 082 1540 74 58 
Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Boletín mensual and Se-
ries monetarias. 
aGross inflows less amortization and interest payments. 
increase in the means of payment. If mecha-
nisms are applied to reduce the build-up of 
domestic credit, a situation arises where a 
substantial part of the effort made by the public 
sector is nullified by growth in money arising 
from the balance-of-payments situation. 
It should be mentioned that repayment 
of the official external debt helped to create 
this situation, since an 'active' net inflow of 
foreign exchange was needed to make the pay-
ments, even though it is not possible to dis-
count the use of international reserves, at least 
in part, for that purpose.20 Nevertheless, the 
foreign exchange required did not have to be 
generated by the private sector. The Chilean 
public sector might also have helped to refi-
nance the debt by means of new foreign bor-
rowing, although this was not the option fol-
lowed, so that the foreign exchange needed 
to service the external debt had to be obtained 
through the trade balance or the private capital 
account. 
2 Naturally, the monetary 'impact' of payments on 
the foreign debt is not unconnected with the way in 
which the public sector generates the required resources. 
In particular, cases where the fiscal deficit is reduced 
should be distinguished from cases of government bor-
rowing irom the Central Bank. 
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To the above should be added the objec-
tive of increasing the country's internation-
al reserves (which, however, probably grew 
faster than was desired); this necessarily im-
posed a very active role on exchange opera-
tions within the scheme of monetary emis-
sions, leading to delays in reducing the growth 
of the means of payment. 
2. The counter-inflation policy and 
demand for money 
O n e of the aspects of the economic policy 
which attracts most attention is the excessively 
passive attitude of the economic authorities 
both to managing demand for money and to 
influencing the community's inflationary ex-
pectations.21 It is well known that the liquidity 
ratio is determined by the public in general, 
b u t the cost of keeping money can neverthe-
less be affected by the behaviour of the Central 
Bank. In this regard, the moment chosen to 
free interest rates,22 which, in view of the pre-
vailing circumstances, could be counted on to 
rise to extraordinarily high levels, does not 
appear to have been in keeping with the 
counter-inflation policy, both because of its 
implications for the velocity of circulation (see 
table 5) of already existing money23 and be-
cause of the impact on demand for international 
finance. 
There can be no doubt that the freeing of 
the interest rate, in an intensely inflationary 
context, together with a relatively slow de-
valuation, stimulated the economic agents to 
2 1 The exceptions —perhaps somewhat belated— ap-
pear to have been two revaluations of the peso (July 1976 
and March 1977), the establishment of a daily deprecia-
tion schedule for the peso starting in February 1978, and 
the endeavour to 'guide ' interest rates in the capital 
market, which was of very brief duration. 
2 2 This coincided with a time of extremely high infla-
tion, severe restrictions on public expenditure, and the 
sale to the private sector of an appreciable number of 
enterprises with large State shareholdings. 
^ T h i s is due to the fact that the type of financial 
assets which were becoming most profitable, and which 
were not previously available to economic agents, did 
not include those that comprise money as traditionally 
defined, although this definition was used as a guide and 
indicator of the expansionary or restrictive nature ot 
monetary policy. 
keep their financial assets (in the form of quasi-
money) in pesos and their liabilities in dol-
lars.24 Naturally, these two phenomena were 
inconsistent with a counter-inflation strategy 
which involved an attempt to reduce the rate 
of growth in (nominal) money, especially as 
no decisive action was taken on the determi-
nants of the (real) demand for money. 
Accordingly, the timing of the sales of 
State assets and the freeing of the interest rate 
does not appear very appropriate in the light 
of the effort made as regards fiscal discipline, 
which, inter alia, contributed to a sharp drop 
in investment and an extraordinarily large 
increase in unemployment. 
One interesting aspect was only tackled 
in part; this was the effort to increase demand 
for money by reducing the reserve requirement 
on bank deposits and/or by the payment by the 
Central Bank of adequate interest on the legal 
reserves maintained by the banking system.25 
As is well known, the reserve requirement 
on deposits is equivalent, from the viewpoint of 
the banks, to a tax on the use of a 'factor of 
production'. Reducing the reserve require-
ment amounts to lowering the tax rate, while 
paying interest on the reserve, in the final 
analysis, reduces the magnitude of this tax. 
Accordingly, by increasing the capacity 
for making loans or, alternatively, making it 
more profitable for banks to seek deposits, it 
may be hoped that measures such as those 
indicated will further stimulate competition 
among banks for deposits, which tend to be-
come more attractive assets for individuals 
and enterprises, thus increasing the quantity 
2 4 I t should also be mentioned that the domestic 
financial system was liberalized only partially, and this, 
according to some analysts, was a principal cause of the 
high spread between interest rates to borrowers and to 
lenders. See McKinnon, op. cit., pp. 22-57, and "Repre-
sión financiera y el problema de la liberalización dentro 
d e los países menos desarrollados", Cuadernos de Econo-
mía, No.~47 (April 1979), pp. 3-22. 
2 5 In practice, this latter mechanism operated by 
reducing the reserve requirement for the following 
month by an amount equivalent to the interest payable 
on the reserve maintained during the previous month. 
Thus the 'payment ' of interest did not cause increases in 
currency issue, as its effect was manifested in the be-
haviour of the bank multiplier. 
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of them sought.26 Of course, this increase 
should be compared with the rise in currency 
issue and the probable increase in the value of 
the bank multiplier arising both from the 
reduction in the reserve requirement and from 
an expected decline in the currency/deposit 
ratio. 
Another point which merits emphasis in 
connexion with a counter-inflation policy 
based on an effort to reduce the growth rate of 
the nominal money supply is the need to pay 
attention to the evolution of the flow demand 
for money. The more traditional type of mone-
tary analysis takes account only of money as a 
stock, and it is in this sense that both the supply 
ol money and demand for it are usually studied. 
A more relevant concept for evaluating the 
short-term implications of monetary imbal-
ances, however, refers to the flow of supply 
and demand for money, and the latter corre-
sponds to demand for money over a given 
period of time. 
Either as a consequence of imbalances 
between the real stock of money sought and 
the existing stock, or of economic growth, of 
expectations of a reduction in the cost of 
holding money, of the probable lower yield 
from assets used as substitutes for money, of 
demand for nominal money to replenish the 
real stock sought, or of a combination of these 
factors, a given demand will exist for nominal 
money flow. 
If the monetary authority does not meet 
it, there will be an excess supply of goods and 
a fall in the rate of economic activity, though 
even so inflationary pressures will notábate for 
some time. This would be a possible 'monetary' 
2(1 It should be noted that, from the viewpoint of the 
financial institutions, the payment of interest at market 
rates on legal reserves is equivalent to a reduction in the 
reserves, so that the large spread between interest rates 
to borrowers and to lenders would tend to diminish. II 
this spread is defined as m and is expressed, like the other 
variables, per unit of deposit, then m - i - i = g + c + 
e i - e. i., where i = rate oí interest tooorrowers; e. = 
. U i l , 1 1 il . . . 1 
legal reserve requirement; e = actual reserve ratio; il = 
rate of interest applicable to the legal reserve; c = admin-
istration and intermediation costs; i = interest rate to 
lenders; g = profit. Changes in i. and e. of such a 
magnitude as to modify the spread m by a given amount 
do not necessarily have the same impact an the value of 
the bank multiplier or, consequently, on money. 
explanation of the phenomenon of'stagflation'. 
According to some authors, tire mechanism 
described above could have provided a funda-
mental explanation for the Chilean situation in 
1975.*" 
Because of the magnitude ol the tax re-
presented by inflation2" at that time, and be-
cause the monetary authority insisted on con-
trolling the growth of M p there was an excess 
demand for nominal money flow. This im-
balance was reflected in excess supply in the 
goods market, so that the macroeconomic 
adjustment occurred fundamentally in the 
form of a profound economic recession, thus 
reducing demand for real monetary balances.29 
The above points to the need to ensure 
that a counter-inflation programme which is 
aimed at moderating growth in M( should also 
take into account the evolution of demand for 
money, especially when the real liquidity of 
the economy is excessively low.30 This latter 
aspect is of great importance since, at least in 
the Chilean case, there is some evidence that 
when the cost of holding money becomes 
excessively high, real demand for money stock 
becomes very inelastic vis-à-vis tfie inflation 
rate,31 whereas this does not, of course, happen 
with the flow demand for money. 
2 7 See L. Sjastaad and H. Cortés, "El enfoque mone-
tario de la balanza de pagos y las tasas de interés real en 
Chile" , in University of Chile, Department of Economics, 
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, Santiago, 
Estudios de Economía, No. 11, first half of 1978, p. 13. 
2 y See R. Zahler and E. Budinich, "Financiamiento 
gubernamental, emisión e impuesto inflación", Estudios 
de Economía, No. 8 (second half of 1976), p. 138. 
2 y The attempt to regulate one or other of the determi-
nants of demand for money meant a delay in domestic 
financial liberalization. As far as the official economic 
strategy was concerned, die financial reform was ap-
parently oí such priority that it was decided to sacrifice 
the performance of other markets and economic sectors in 
order not to hold up the evolution and development of the 
capital market. 
301n the Chilean case, real demand for money stock 
dropped sharply until mid-1976, from which date the 
liquidity coefficient began to rise. For the implementation 
of monetary policy in the short-term it is very important 
to be able to determine the evolution of demand for 
money stock (real) and demand for money flows (nominal), 
since at different moments in time stock and flow dis-
equilibria of different intensities may coexist, or there 
may be equilibrium with respect to stock and disequilibria 
with respect to flows, and vice versa. 
31 When die rate of inflation (actual and expected) is 
very high, economic agents tend to replace real monetary 
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3. Counter-inflation policy, the exchange rate 
and the rate of interest 
As is well known, in a small, open economy 
with a non-floating exchange rate there is very 
close relationship between exchange, mone-
tary and credit policies. The Chilean case fits 
this description in many respects. 
A matter continuously under discussion 
is what the 'equilibrium' exchange rate should 
be, and what exchange rate policy would be 
most appropriate. If it is accepted that the 
monetary authority should fix the exchange 
rate instead of letting it float, what criterion 
should guide forward planning of the exchange 
rate? A great deal has been written on this 
matter, and it will undoubtedly continue to be 
a subject of debate between economists for a 
long time to come. A recent meeting jointly 
organized by CEPAL and the Central Bank of 
Uruguay contributed some interesting ideas 
(of great importance for the countries of Latin 
America) to this old discussion.32 The para-
graphs below contain a few additional reflec-
tions prompted by Chilean experience in the 
last five years. 
It would seem that forward planning of 
the exchange rate in Chile was guided by at 
least two criteria: differences between inter-
national and domestic inflation rates, and the 
level of the country's international reserves.33 
Furthermore, it was sometimes used to help 
balances within their portfolios of assets by other financial 
and physical assets which offer a higher yield than money. 
Nevertheless, until money is replaced by other goods as a 
means of exchange for carrying out transactions, there is a 
'minimum' level of real money which, because of its 
liquidity, is essential for effecting payments in the econo-
my. Thus , over and above a certain (high) rate of inflation, 
real demand for money stock becomes very inelastic. 
However, since nominal demand for money flow depends 
directly on the rate of inflation, among other things, it 
becomes necessary in a counter-inflation programme to 
reconcile the evolution of supply and demand for money 
flows, by taking the appropriate policy measures. See in 
this regard footnote 30 and Zahler and Budinich, op. cit., 
p. 142. 
^Seminario sobre politica cambiaria, Central Bank ot 
Uruguay and CEPAL, Montevideo, August 1978. 
^ S e e A. Bardón, "Algunas experiencias de la política 
cambiaría en Chile (1973-1978)", in Seminario.sobre polí-
tica cambiaría, op. cit., and McKinnon, op. cit. 
guide expectations of inflation and, through 
its influence on exports and imports, to secure 
a desired deficit on the current account of the 
balance of payments. 
This was undoubtedly a case of an attempt 
to use an instrument to reach various objectives 
which are not necessarily compatible. In par-
ticular, it was not clear whether the exchange 
rate was a mechanism to be used to control the 
commercial opening up, or whether its evolu-
tion had to be planned in the light of the evolu-
tion of the exchange market. For example, 
during periods of very slow devaluation, and 
even revaluation, the inflow of short-term 
capital rose, apparently stimulated by expecta-
tions concerning the ratio between the future 
rate of devaluation and the evolution of the 
domestic interest rate. In this way, if the ex-
change rate is used merely as an instrument of 
monetary control, without combining it with 
proper planning as regards the relative yields 
of the different liabilities in the financial 
system, this may, at least for a time, produce 
effects very different from those expected.34 
This latter factor is of particular importance 
because of the close relationship between ex-
change rate management and interest rate 
management. 
When the exchange rate is indexed, while 
the interest rate is free and rises to the very 
high levels it reached in the Chilean case, 
there is no doubt that this provides an enor-
mous stimulus for the inflow of financial capi-
tal. Indeed, attempts to regulate or control this 
inflow will be fruitless if the interest rate 
differential between the domestic economy 
and outside, after discounting expectations of 
a devaluation (which may include exchange 
rate risk in parallel markets) is sufficiently 
attractive. 
This, it would appear, was what happened 
in the Chilean economy. If total international 
reserves are taken as a guide in determining 
the exchange rate, a situation arises where, as 
a consequence of the initially restrictive mone-
tary policy, the domestic interest rate rises; as 
•^For more details see C. Massad, "La paradoja de 
sept iembre", Estudios de Economía, No. 5 (first half of 
1975), pp. 51-56. 
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a result, the inflow of external capital is stimu-
lated and the exchange rate is depressed (in 
relative terms).35 
This means that the current account deficit 
and the consequent external borrowing are 
greater than they would have been if the evolu-
tion of the exchange rate had been planned 
using another criterion, with more rapid de-
valuations. 
In this way the country is placed in a 
situation where the economic recovery can 
be slowed down by the continuing restrictions 
on government expenditure (which ceases to 
be the 'cause' of inflation, but whose inactivity 
is an important factor in the slowness of the 
recovery), together with lower net external 
demand than would have existed if a different 
combination of monetary, fiscal and exchange 
policies had been applied. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the real 
exchange rate in Chile, despite the lowering 
of tariffs and the worsening of the terms of 
trade which occurred in the period 1975-
1978,36 was on average 2.3% below its average 
value in 1974.37 In addition, it was very un-
stable as regards its role in allocating resources 
for export activities and import substitution, as 
the currency had been devalued in 1975 and 
1978 and revalued in 1976 and 1977.3» T n i s 
would indicate that the reduction in tariffs 
was one of the factors accounting for the mar-
ked growth in the country's exports and im-
ports in the recent period, principally through 
the reduction in the cost of imported raw 
materials, inputs and capital goods.39 
T h e sharp deterioration in the current 
3 5 l i t h e capital account is freed more rapidly, this latter 
effect will be magnified. 
^ I n the period 1975-1978, the average level of the 
terms-of-trade index was 77, compared with 85 in 1960-
1964, 119 in 1965-1969 and 121 in 1970-1974. 
3 7 See table 7. Of course, the problem of properly 
def inin" what is the equilibrium' real exchange rate 
remain' ' 
3H Neve ruleless, it would seem to have been perceived 
as fairly stable compared with the evolution of the ex-
change rate between 1971 and 1973. 
3 9Naturally, the sharp devaluation in 1974 and 1975, 
the initial drop in domestic aggregate demand and the 
unused export capacity existing at the end of 1973 played 
a fundamental role in the rise in exports, and especially oí 
non-traditional exports. 
account balance in 1977 and 1978, and the 
preliminary projections for 1979, indicate that 
a more rapid devaluation would be desirable,40 
to generate foreign exchange by means of a 
smaller current account deficit. In this way 
greater protection would be granted to the 
domestic market and, subject to success in 
modifying expectations of devaluation, the 
inflow of international capital would be mod-
erated, while there would be still greater 
stimulation of non-traditional exports, whose 
real growth rate, in relation to the tariff reduc-
tions, must tend to decline because of the fact 
that, once the planned level and structure of 
tariffs has been reached, the additional stimuli 
to activities which make intensive use of 
imported goods cease. 
In addition, the rate of external borrowing, 
which in 1978 and 1979 grew much faster than 
the average for the period, would be reduced. 
In this regard it has recently been asserted 
that, in the case of the Chilean economy, 
foreign borrowing is not of great importance, 
since most of the loans are contracted by the 
private sector, thus ensuring the profitability 
of externally financed projects. In this way, it 
is argued, servicing of the external debt would 
be ensured automatically through the efficien-
cy associated with the uses to which it would 
be put. 
However, it would appear necessary to 
point out that the above argument is exces-
sively simplistic. Because of the considerable 
recent build-up of external debt, the exchange 
rate has been held down, making its long-term 
adjustment more difficult. However, the real 
cost of servicing the external debt in the future 
requires not only the generation of domestic 
saving, but also its conversion into foreign 
exchange. Accordingly, if important changes 
occur in the terms of trade, in international 
liquidity or in domestic economic or institu-
tional circumstances, so that the country does 
not enjoy the present abundance of foreign 
exchange, it might be necessary to modify the 
parity, with corresponding implications for the 
4t lNaturally, in view oí the openness of the economy, 
a measure of this nature would have an inflationary impact 
derived from the increase in the Chilean peso prices of 
internationally tradable goods and services. 
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real value of the external debt expressed in 
terms of domestic resources, and for the social 
efficiency of the externally financed projects. 
As already noted, prior commitments as 
regards payment of the official external debt 
imposed strong pressures on the monetary 
sector. However, it is not clear what procedure 
for the generation of foreign exchange would 
be most appropriate —a surplus on the non-
compensatory capital account or a smaller 
deficit on the current account. Perhaps during 
the period of highest inflation stimulation of. 
the exchange rate might have offered some 
disadvantages. 
Nevertheless, a rate of devaluation per-
sistently lower than the differential between 
domestic and international nominal interest 
rates stimulates the flow of international capi-
tal to the country, and when this inflow does 
not finance a current account deficit, but is 
principally used to build up international re-
serves, it does not contribute to raising total 
saving. In fact, for a given level of growth of 
the quantity of money, external credit actually 
competes with domestic credit; in contrast, if 
the inflow of international capital takes the 
form of a larger current account deficit, external 
saving is increased. 
The combination of devaluation (revalua-
tion) and domestic interest rates are not inde-
pendent of the inflow of foreign exchange and 
the creation of base money. Nor are they 
independent of the degree of substitution 
and/or complementarity between domestic 
and foreign saving. It would seem from Chilean 
experience that the exchange rate is not an 
appropriate instrument to control the monetary 
base, especially when it is used in isolation.41 
Insistence on forward planning of the ex-
change rate using this criterion has important 
effects on other economic policy objectives, 
particularly foreign borrowing, complemen-
tarity between domestic and external saving, 
and the allocation of resources between do-
mestic and tradable goods, all of which must 
be properly evaluated in terms of the objective 
of stabilizing the level of prices. 
Il l 
Opening up to the exterior in the financial field42 
One aspect of Chilean economic policy which 
is out of keeping with the general approach 
which has guided the economic programme in 
the last five years relates to the opening up of 
the Chilean economy to international financial 
capital. I t is interesting to note that recent 
developments in Argentina and Uruguay have 
been much more liberal in this regard, but at 
the same time rather more cautious and 'grad-
ualist' as regards the commercial opening up. 
Despite the common impression that 
Chile borrowed a great deal between 1975 and 
1978,43 the empirical evidence indicates that 
this view should be carefully evaluated. In 
nominal terms, between the end of 1974 and 
the end of 1978 the country contracted loans 
totalling US$ 2,137 million, increasing its gross 
4 1 However, the more open die economy is to external 
influences, the greater the importance acquired by die 
evolution of the exchange rate as a direct determinant of 
domestic i'nfiation (not through its influence on die mon-
etary base), together with international inflation and the 
characteristics of markets for goods and services which are 
not internationally tradable. 
4 2 T h e analysis which follows refers to financial credit 
rather than to direct external investment, because of the 
separate determinants of each, the low level of direct 
investment compared with loans (between 1975 and 1978 
external investment accounted for 20% of the net flow of 
non-compensatory capital, since private loans accounted 
for more than 100% of that flow), and the closer relationship 
between private loans and the financial aspects of macro-
economic policy. 
•^This may have been due to the fact that during this 
period external borrowing was in fact strongly stimulated 
by the relatively slow devaluation and the objective of 
sharply increasing the country's international reserve 
position and permitting a substantial rise in interest rates to 
borrowers. 
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reserves by US$ 1,062 million, giving nominal 
net borrowing of US$ 1,075 million. This is 
equivalent to cumulative growth of 25.4% over 
the net debit balance at the end of 1974, in 
other words, an annual average rate of nominal 
net borrowing of below 6% (see table 11). 
However, it should be mentioned that the net 
borrowing figures underestimate the 'actual' 
nominal debt to some extent, since it is neces-
sary to maintain a high level of reserves in order 
to retain access to external financing. 
Table 11 
CHILE: EXTERNAL DEBT, 1973-1978 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Table 12 




































Source: Central Bank of Chile, Deuda Externa de Chile 
1978. 
Note: T h e external debt figures refer to sums actually 
disbursed outstanding at the end of each year. They 
include traditional debt and other external liabilities 
comprising the International Monetary Fund, 
suppliers ' credits and financial credits to the private 
sector, as well as short-term lines of credit to 
commercial banks, the Banco del Estado and the 
Central Bank. 
'Real' net borrowing is usually estimated 
by deflating the nominal value of the external 
debt by an index of the unit value of the 
country's imports. During the four years 1975-
1978, if this procedure is used, Chile's real 
gross external debt fell at an average rate of 
0.4%, and the real net debt fell at an annual 
average rate of 3.9% (see table 12). 
However, as has been asserted in a recent 
study,44 the methodology set out above suffers 
' " S e e Carlos Massad and Roberto Zahler, "Inflación 
mundial y deuda externa: El caso del deflactor impropio", in 








a b c 
10.2 -8.3 82.4 
-1.3 -3.2 -8.0 
4.6 -5.7 16.4 
27.2 17.8 34.0 
9.7 -0.4 27.2 
Net debt 
a b e 
14.1 -5.1 88.7 
-9.4 11.2-15.6 
4.2 -6.1 16.0 
16.5 7.8 22.7 
5.8 -3.9 22.7 
Sources: Table 11. 
CEPAL: Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1978. 
a Growth rate of the nominal external debt. 
^Growth rate of the nominal external debt deflated by the 
index of import prices. 
cGrowth rate of the nominal external debt deflated by the 
terms-of-trade index. 
d Average annual growth rate during the period. 
from serious limitations, and it seems more 
appropriate, in measuring the effective debt 
burden, to deflate it by an index of the terms of 
trade. This calculation, in the Chilean case, 
leads to the conclusion that the average annual 
growth rates of the gross and net debt during 
the period 1975-1978 reached 27.2% and 22.7% 
respectively. In other words, real growth in the 
external debt thus defined, in the last four 
years, was three times the growth of the 
nominal external debt. 
Furthermore, provisional figures indicate 
that in 1979, as in 1978, external borrowing 
showed a sharply increasing trend. 
Despite the above, it would have seemed 
reasonable to expect a much greater inflow of 
external credits in view of the very high 
domestic interest rates, the low interest rates 
on international markets, the abundance of 
international liquidity and the evolution of the 
exchange rate in Chile.45 
la CEPAL No. 19, Santiago, Chile (English version enti-
tled "World inflation and foreign debt: the case of the 
improper deflator", CEPAL internal document No. 79-4-
978). 
4 5 I t should be remembered that the domestic interest 
rate in dollars was 60% a year on average between 1975 and 
1978. 
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In order to understand the smaller relative 
inflow of financial capital to the Chilean econo-
my from an economic viewpoint, three main 
aspects should be borne in mind. 
Firstly, it is necessary to point out that in 
the first years of application of the new eco-
nomic policy, the attitude of the international 
financial community to Chile was very cau-
tious, so that until well into 1977 there were 
probably substantial limitations on external 
borrowing on the supply side. 
A second consideration is that, while the 
public sector increased its debt very slowly, the 
same did not happen with the private sector. As 
can be seen from table 15 below, in the four 
years under review the public sector increased 
its external debt by 17%, while the rise in the 
private sector debt was 228%. This has impor-
tant implications in the held of redistribution, 
as will be indiated below. 
A third factor which helps to explain the 
phenomenon is the set of obstacles and restric-
tions imposed by the monetary authorities on 
such external capital as might be appropriated 
by the domestic financial system.46 
The most important limitations on the 
inflow of external credits47 include those 
relating to minimum periods for repatriation, 
and those which restrict bank borrowing in 
foreign currency in terms of the sums involved 
(which are tied to the banks' capital and 
reserves), the speed with which they can be 
increased (because of restrictions on the flow of 
borrowing), and the capacity to grant guaran-
tees.48 
There are also two further aspects of this 
subject which merit thorough analysis: one 
4 6 See note 15 and D. Tapia, "Apertura al mercado 
financiero internacional", in Institucionalidad económica 
e integración financiera con el exterior (Santiago, Chile, 
Insti tuto d e Estudios Bancários Guillermo Subercaseaux, 
1979), pp. 107-130. 
4 7 There were substantial modifications and simplifi-
cations in this regard during 1979. 
4 8 These limitations are those imposed on demand for 
loans. It must not be forgotten that, even with total 
openness , there are also important imperfections, such as 
market fragmentation, differential guarantees, imperfect 
information, risk evaluations and quantitative rationing by 
banks in addition to rationing by price, positive-slope 
supply of external credit, and so on. 
relating to the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments, and the other to the 
implications for resource allocation and wealth 
distribution of the type of restrictions imposed 
on external borrowing. However, the lack of 
sufficient disaggregated, up-to-date informa-
tion makes it necessary to conduct the discus-
sion in broad terms, in the form of questions, 
merely laying down a few general recom-
mendations which, in our view, may be in-
ferred from the Chilean experience. 
1. Financial opening up to the exterior and 
the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments 
As already indicated, the economic strategy 
relating to external financing does not fall 
squarely within the general lines of economic 
policy. 
It would appear that the economic authori-
ties considered, at least until the middle of 
1979, that the so-called monetary approach to 
the balance of payments has greater validity in 
the long than in the short term. If dynamic 
aspects of movements in the balance-of-pay-
ments accounts, patterns of adjustment in 
variables, etc., are ignored, the process of 
opening up to the international capital market 
and complete integration into it (together with 
the liberalization of the domestic capital 
market, including reforms of reserve require-
ments, and so on) would, according to the 
monetary theory of the balance of payments, 
generate a large inflow of external credit and a 
very rapid tendency for the domestic interest 
rate and international rates (adjusted for a 
certain risk) to become equal. This would 
furnish a substantial stimulus to investment, 
especially in construction (one of the most 
depressed economic sectors in the last five 
years), and promote a rise in economic activity. 
The principal drawb ¿» ks of such a measure 
are connected with the adjustment process, 
and particularly its possible repercussions on 
inflation (depending on the degree of commer-
cial opening up and the exchange rate policy 
adopted, through monetization of the accumu-
lation of reserves), the external borrowing 
position and the probable drop in the rate of 
devaluation, with the consequent adverse 
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effects on economic activity and employment 
(particularly in the sectors producing tradable 
goods).4" 
The main argument cited by the economic 
authorities against a complete liberalization of" 
the external financial market refers to the 
potential impact of a massive inflow of external 
capital on the money supply, and consequent-
ly on the stabilization effort.50 In fact, it is 
necessary to assess the elasticity of demand for 
finance vis-à-vis the interest rate, identify the 
monetary repercussions of the measure (in-
cluding the larger deficit on the current ac-
count of the balance of payments) and compare 
them with the expected evolution of demand 
for money. 
There are very few empirical studies in 
Chile concerning the behaviour of the market 
for loanable funds. However, recent experi-
ence suggests that a very substantial capital 
inflow would be required in order to lower the 
interest rate.51 If this occurred, it would gener-
ate an excess supply of money flows, with 
equilibrium being achieved in three basic 
ways. 
The first way is adjustment through an 
increase in output andior prices, principally of 
goods which are not internationally tradable, 
with the resulting repercussions on economic 
activity and/or the general level of prices. 
The second adjustment variable would act 
through the domestic financial market, by 
means of a rise in demand for money (appro-
priately defined) arising from the possible 
reduction in the cost of holding liquid balan-
ces, and from the rise in the volume of tran-
sactions. 
4 9Obviously, there are other arguments in favour of not 
allowing a complete opening up to external capital, such as 
the political arguments which recognize the implications of 
a situation where a substantial proportion of domestic 
capital is in foreign hands, as well as others related to the 
imperfections of the capital markets, information costs, 
market fragmentation and, above all as regards direct 
investment, arguments related to the mode of operation of 
the transnational corporations. 
5 ü See Tapia, op. cit. 
5 1 This assertion refers to the implications which an 
inflow of credit would have for external debt, rather than to 
high interest-elasticity of demand for external finance. The 
domestic interst rate depends not only on external finance, 
but also on domestic saving. Domestic saving dropped 
sharply during the period under consideration. The short 
term domestic interest rate expressed in dollars in the 
Finally, the third means of adjustment is a 
change in the current account balance of the 
balance of payments. Naturally, the more open 
the economy to the exterior, and the greater the 
trade links with international markets for real 
goods and services, the more important this 
variable is. Consequently, it is very likely that a 
more rapid opening up to external finance 
would only temporarily generate greater infla-
tionary pressures and a certain improvement in 
output of non-tradable goods and services. The 
main result would be a larger trade gap, with a 
consequent rise in external indebtedness and a 
fall in levels of activity and employment in 
the sector producing internationally tradable 
goods. 
However, this last conclusion is closely 
linked to the exchange rate policy adopted 
during the external financial liberalization. If 
the movement of the exchange rate is guided by 
the evolution of the current account and the 
external debt, with the currency being deva-
lued more rapidly or more slowly as the current 
account deficit or the level of external debt 
increases or declines, there will be a rise in the 
level of prices, increasing nominal demand for 
money. The build-up of international reserves, 
accompanied in this case by the attempt to 
reduce the growth rate of money, means that 
external financing replaces domestic credit, 
without necessarily helping to generate a 
greater volume of domestic saving. If, on the 
other hand, the exchange rate policy is guided 
by the balance-of-payments position, a grow-
ing accumulation of international reserves 
would lead to a slower devaluation (or a 
revaluation), with an increase in the current 
account deficit and the external debt. In this 
way, external financing constitutes foreign 
savings, which, assuming a certain level of 
domestic savings, helps to ensure that the 
expenditure of the economy exceeds the level 
of the product.52 
middle of 1979 was still very high, despite a .substantial 
inflow of capital. In 1975-1978 the inflow oí private capital 
(net of amortization and interst payments) was equivalent 
to 4% ot gross domestic product expenditure, rising to 7% 
in 1978. 
5 2Obviously, domestic saving is not independent of 
external saving: the relationship between them should be 
specified in each particular case. 
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It should be noted that increasing external 
borrowing leads to a 'negative' externality 
because of the criteria used by creditors in 
evaluating risks and solvency, so that the social 
marginal cost (for the country) of external 
borrowing is greater than the private marginal 
cost. This is an argument in favour of imposing 
a tax on the raising of external finance, even 
when there is complete external financial 
openness. 
On the basis of the interest rate differen-
tial, the exchange rate policy followed and 
recognition of the delayed action of economic 
policy, it seems clear that more rapid external 
financial opening up would, in the Chilean 
case, have led to greater net external borrow-
ing, a fall in the level of activity in the sector 
producing tradable goods and a rise in domes-
tic liquidity (or a combination of the three 
effects), thus justifying the authorities' concern 
to control the degree of external financial 
openness.53 
However it cannot be denied that more 
thorough-going domestic financial liberaliza-
tion and a stronger devaluation of the peso 
would have substantially reduced the influ-
ence of private capital from abroad, probably 
stimulating domestic saving and lessening the 
impact of exchange operations —through the 
capital account of the balance of payments— 
on currency issue and the counter-inflation 
strategy. 
Since a decision was taken to move faster 
towards openness in the trade field than in the 
financial field,54 it would seem to be of interest 
to study this phenomenon, and particularly the 
way in which external finance was restricted, 
and its implications for the Chilean economy. 
These points are analysed below. 
^ I t should also be pointed out that any fall in the 
domestic interest rate would have produced a stimulus 
(though probably a small one) to investment, and accord-
ingly to economic growth and employment. 
M I n our view, while it was necessary to regulate the 
flow of external capital to the country (a phenomenon 
which would have occurred more easily with a more gradul 
commercial opening up), the mechanisms used were far 
from being the most effective and equitable ones. 
2. Some 'real' consequences of the control of 
external finance 
One of the most interesting subjects of analysis 
in the Chilean economic experience is the way 
in which the external financial opening up was 
controlled. This is because normally in order to 
ensure consistency with the remaining mea-
sures adopted, it would have seemed natural to 
expect a total opening up to international 
capital markets, or alternatively, from consi-
derations of short term macroeconomic equi-
librium,55 the rationing of external credit by 
price, which was the mechanism governing 
most of the remaining economic decisions. 
However, the procedure adopted56 in-
volved establishing de facto quantitative 
restrictions on external borrowing,57 especially 
in the case of the domestic financial system, 
which enjoys greatest ease of access to the 
international capital market. As already noted, 
the capital and reserves of the financial enter-
prises limited both their external borrowing 
and their capacity to issue guarantees, and 
there was in addition a general limitation on all 
economic agents as regards the periods of time 
for which external funds could be borrowed. 
The above becomes even more important 
if it is remembered that, in addition to im-
posing this type of limitation on external 
borrowing, the interest rate in the capital 
market was freed, trade was rapidly opened 
up, the major part of the process of selling off 
State enterprises to the private sector took 
place, and strict discipline was imposed on the 
State sector and on public enterprises. 
These measures led to a sharp rise to 
extraordinarily high levels in the real rate of 
5 5 It is important to note that in very few other areas of 
the economy was as much concern shown lor the short term 
and the adjustment process. 
^ I n June 1979, the restrictions on the contracting of 
external loans by banks and finance companies were 
modified. 
5 7 I t is reasonable to argue that, because of the specific 
characteristics of flows of international financial capital, 
their volatility, creditors' attitudes and risk assessment, and 
so on, it is necessary to establish some form of quantitative 
regulation of the inflow of external credit. However, there 
are different ways of ensuring this regulation, with dif-
ferent effects in terms of efficiency and redistribution. 
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interst to borrowers in the financial system,58 
And to a very profound change in the level and 
structure of aggregate demand and consump-
tion and in the relative prices of goods and 
factors. The consequences of this situation are 
to some extent reflected in the investment and 
unemployment situation in Chile during the 
period (see table 13). Excessive demand for 
finance also arose, partly because of the sale of 
State-owned enterprises, and was aggravated 
by demand generated on the domestic capital 
market by public enterprises, which found that 
contributions from the government, and credits 






































Sources: University of Chile, Department of Economics: 
Comentarios sobre la situación económica, 1978, 
1979; and Ocupación y desocupación en el Gran 
Santiago, various issues. 
aSimple average of the rates for March, June, September 
and December. 
bGross domestic fixed capital investment as a proportion of 
gross domestic product expenditure. 
Accordingly, two important consequences 
arising from the phenomenon under discussion 
are those relating to the evolution of invest-
ment and to the allocation of resources. 
There is no doubt that the high rates of 
interest on loans provide an explanation, even 
though a partial one, of the depressed level of 
private investment in the period; to this should 
be added the drop in public sector invest-
ment.59 In addition, the enterprises which had 
access to external credit were characterized by 
their large size and their use of relatively 
capital-intensive technology, so that there was 
no guarantee that their investment would 
necessarily generate high levels of employ-
ment or be the most efficient from a ^social 
viewpoint. 
In this regard it is interesting to observe 
how in these years, despite some liberalization 
of the domestic financial market, some of the 
features of the way the financial system was 
traditionally managed persisted. Thus, the dual 
nature of the industrial structure and the 
distribution of income has tended to be re-
tained, so that a handful of companies receive 
substantial amounts of credit on preferential 
terms which they invest in over-capitalized 
enterprises that are only partially used. In this 
way this sector generates large incomes, while 
most of the smaller, fairly labour-intensive 
enterprises subsist with extraordinarily high 
financial costs. 
It may also be held that, as in the past, such 
a restricted financial system grants clear advan-
tages to those enterprises which have direct or 
indirect access to preferential credit (in this 
case credit from abroad), and to those which 
can make use of their undistributed profits, 
ei ther from within the enterprise or from other 
enterprises belonging to the same economic 
group. In Chile, a substantial group of enter-
prises combine all these advantages, and are 
accordingly improving their competitive posi-
tion, though this does not necessarily corre-
spond to an increase in their productive ef-
ficiency. 
It may be deduced from the above para-
graphs that the mechanisms used to control the 
flow of external loans to Chile did not promote 
an adequate level of investment, nor the effi-
cient allocation of it, but instead probably made 
58The rate to lenders, though it has increasingly been 
positive, has not been very high because of the wide spread 
between the rates to lenders and to borrowers. 
59Public sector investment, which in 1974 represented 
12% of gross domestic product expenditure, made up only 
6.4% in 1977. 
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possible a substantial change in the distribu-
tion and concentration of wealth. 
Because of the form of the attempts made 
to regulate the flow of external borrowing, 
conditions were created which enabled enter-
prises with access to international credit to 
obtain substantial profits. In other words, 
because of the way in which the 'import quota' 
of financial capital was distributed, a profit was 
generated from the difference between the 
international and the domestic price of such 
capital.60 
There is even evidence that some enter-
prises engaged in import activities funda-
mentally because of the attraction of the ex-
ternal credit associated with importing. It has 
also been alleged that the deficit on the current 
account of the balance of payments is over-
estimated because of the incentive for under-
invoicing exports and over-invoicing imports, 
with the difference entered in the form of 
external credit. 
Preliminary, very conservative estimates 
indicate that the transfer obtained in this way 
by private enterprises enjoying access to 
external credit during the period 1976-1978 
totalled at least US$ 540 million, rising to over 
US$ 650 million by mid-197961 (see table 14). 
^ I t should nevertheless be stressed that, indepen-
dently of the degree of external financial openness, many 
imperfections remain in the domestic and international 
capital markets. 
61 At the end of 1978, the sales value of the State-owned 
enterprises sold to the private sector during the period 
stood at US$ 585 million. 
Table 14 
CHILE; FINANCIAL PROFITS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES ENJOYING ACCESS 






1979 (first halí) 
Interest rate Alternative (1) 
Article 14b 
LIBOR Chile Differen-
t i a l a Private 
sector 
[annual-percentage in US dollars) 
6.12 118.53 1.0629 227 
6.42 58.38 0.4554 287 
9.35 51.10 0.3240 750 






































Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Boletín mensual, May 1979; Deuda Externa de Chile, June 1979. 
«Calculated as the difference between the interest rate on bank loans in Chile, expressed in dollars, and double the LIBOR 
rate. 
bAlternative (1) was calculated on the following assumptions: (a) the only sums entered are credits disbursed to the private 
sector under article 14; (b) they remain in the country for two years; and (c) the amount available per year is equal to half 
the annual flow. This calculation is undervalued both by reason of the coverage of article 14 (article 15, which corresponds 
to credit for the private sector, was not included), and by reason of the period spent in Chile, since these credits remain in 
the country for more than two years; and because no account is taken of the stock of debt under article 14 existing at the 
end of 1975. 
c Alternative (2) is based on balance-of-payments data and refers to the movements (net of amortization payments) of non-
compensatory capital for private use. In this case the assumptions of alternative (1) were repeated for long term and 
medium-term capital movements, while only one year of stay in Chile was assumed for 50% of the total short-term credits. 
For 1979 a movement equal to that of 1978, for all debt periods, was estimated. 
d Alternative (3) is based on the assumption that the total stock owned by the private sector to foreign sources at the end of 
the previous year remains in the market for only one year. Neither traditional private debt nor short-term debt is included. 
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In addition to the above, it should be 
ment ioned that while the private sector was 
securing its financing to an increasing extent 
from abroad, the public sector was doing so at a 
much slower rate. Between the end of 1974 and 
the end of 1978, private debt increased by 
US$ 1,449 million, to more than 30% of the 
country's total stock of debt, compared with 
less than 14% at the end of 1974. The public 
sector, on the other hand, which increased its 
accumulated debt by US$ 688 million, dropped 
its share from 87% at the end of 1974 to slightly 
under 70% at the end of 1978. 
An examination of debt servicing shows 
It is clear from the above not only that there 
was probably inefficient allocation with ten-
dencies towards concentration within the 
domestic private sector, but also that the public 
sector, including naturally public sector enter-
prises, found itself in financial conditions 
which were very disadvantageous compared 
with those private enterprises which enjoyed 
access to external credit on the above-men-
tioned conditions.62 
6 2 I t may be held that the private sector borrowed 
abroad as a way of financing payment of the tax represented 
by inflation, which was very high during this period. 
that the net flow of external resources to the 
public sector in the four years under considera-
tion was negative (—US$ 468 million), while 
the flow to the private sector was US$ 948 
million. If, instead of external debt, balance-of-
payments figures are used, the situation is even 
more favourable to the private sector. More-
over, the proportion of borrowing by the public 
sector during the period 1975-1978 under 
article 14 of Decree-law 471 (the main provi-
sion under which external credits entered the 
country) was less than 8%, while more than 
90% represented borrowing by the private 
sector. 
Criteria of efficiency and equity dictate 
that, ifit is wished to ration external credit, this 
should be done through a tax (supplemented as 
appropriate by other mechanisms) to be col-
lected by the government.63 Although it is true 
However, this tax fell principally on those economic agents 
for whom it was most difficult to replace cash or sight 
deposits by other assets, and on borrowers in the domestic 
market for short-term capital. It is clear that these cate-
gories do not include the major private enterprises with 
access to international finance, to which they resorted 
precisely in order to 'evade' the inflation tax. 
^ T h e measures adopted by the Central Bank in the 
second quarter of 1979, designed to establish obligatory 
Table 15 
CHILE: EXTERNAL DEBT» BY SECTORS, 1973-1978 
















































Source: Institucionalidad económica e integración financiera con el exterior, op. cit. 
a T h e external debt figures refer to sums actually disbursed outstanding at the end of each year. They 
include traditional debt and other external liabilities comprising the International Monetary Fund, 
suppliers ' credits and financial credits to the private sector, as well as short-term lines of credit to 
commercial banks, the Banco del Estado and the Central Bank. 
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Table 16 
CHILE: GROSS AND NET FLOW OF EXTERNAL CREDIT» BY SECTORS 
(Millions ofVS dollars at current prices) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
Gross Debt Net Gross Debt Net Gross Debt Net Gross Debt Net 
flow service flow flow service flow flow service flow flow service flow 
Publ ic sector 768 778 - 1 0 545 868 - 3 2 3 580 1042 - 4 6 2 1529 1202 +327 
Private sector 110 54 56 238 224 14 526 199 327 824 273 551 
Total 878 832 46 783 1092 -309 1 106 1241 -135 2 353 1475 +878 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
a T h e external debt figures refer to sums actually disbursed outstanding at the end of each year. They include 
traditional debt and other external liabilities comprising the International Monetary Fund, suppliers' credits 
and financial credits to the private sector, as well as short-term lines of credit to commercial banks, the Banco 
del Estado and the Central Bank. 
that the domestic and international capital backs associated with certain aspects ofthe way 
market is far from perfect, such a measure in which the quantitative restrictions on the 
would drastically reduce the serious draw- import of capital were applied.64 
IV 
Summary and final comments 
This paper began with a short outline of the 
macroeconomic situation with which economic 
policy in Chile since the end of 1973 has had to 
deal. 
There followed an analysis ofthe founda-
tions of the stabilization strategy which was 
based on an attempt to reduce the growth rate 
of nominal money, as traditionally defined. 
It was felt that this policy tended to be 
inconsistent with the progressive opening up 
ofthe Chilean economy to the exterior, because 
of the increasingly endogenous nature of the 
money supply. Difficulties in controlling base 
money were exacerbated by the extremely 
reserve ratios for the inflow of certain types of external 
credit, are similar to this tax. However, by that time the 
principal redistributive effect had already been conso-
lidated. 
rapid (though partial) liberalization of the 
domestic capital market, especially in the 
context of an extraordinary level of international 
liquidity. 
As a result, the stabilization programme 
appears to have been conceived within the 
frame of reference of a closed economy, since 
as the country's economic relations become 
internationalized, the restrictions on domestic 
credit, and particularly credit to the public 
sector, were modified to a greater or lesser 
extent because of the inflow of foreign ex-
change. This inflow was also stimulated by the 
evolution ofthe domestic interest rate and the 
64 Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier in the text, if the 
supply of external credit becomes very unstable, it may be 
necessary' to resort to some form of direct control, regulated 
by the economic authorities. 
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exchange rate policy followed in 1975-1978. 
Consequently, it is considered that an 
excessive burden fell on the Chilean public 
sector, with the consequent adverse effects on 
the level of investment, employmentand social 
expenditure. 
Limiting the analysis to a non-floating 
exchange rate, it was argued that exchange rate 
policy should not be used as an instrument for 
controlling the money supply (although it is in 
fact an important direct determinant of the 
evolution ofdomestic prices in an open econo-
my), and it was pointed out that an attempt was 
made to use and plan an instrument —the 
exchange rate— on the basis of considerations 
which were not necessarily mutually con-
sistent, such as the level of international re-
serves, external debt, expectations of inflation 
and the differential between domestic and 
international inflation rates. It is, furthermore, 
clear that the application of a succession of 
different exchange rate policy objectives and/ 
or guidelines can lead to excessive instability 
in the real exchange rate. 
The advantages and drawbacks of using 
the evolution of the current account, or that of 
the balance of payments, as the most appro-
priate criterion for exchange rate policy were 
examined, and it was concluded that, if the aim 
is that external financing should be channelled 
so as to ensure the greatest external savings, it 
seems more desirable that the exchange rate 
should follow the level of international re-
serves. If, on the other hand, it is not wished to 
increase external borrowing, and if appropriate 
credit measures designed to reduce the inflow 
of foreign exchange through the capital account 
are not adopted, external financing will prin-
cipally be a substitute for domestic credit. 
It was therefore concluded that the timing 
of the external opening up, the domestic finan-
cial liberalization and the sale of enterprises to 
the private sector was inappropriate in view of 
the effort made by the public sector within the 
framework of the monetary policy. A more 
gradual opening up of trade, and measures 
aimed at directly or indirectly (through credit 
policy) holding back the flow of capital from 
and to the private sector, might have permitted 
a form of monetary planning which placed 
fewer restrictions on government activity and 
that of public enterprises. 
As regards demand for money, emphasis 
was laid on the excessively passive role adopt-
ed by the economic authorities, the conse-
quences of which were aggravated by the 
circumstances prevailing when the develop-
ment of the capital market was promoted. All 
this helped to delay the reduction of inflation, 
and helps to explain a substantial part of the 
process of'stagflation' suffered by the Chilean 
economy during part of the period under 
consideration. 
Accordingly, it was suggested that during 
stabilization processes based on restrictive 
monetary policies, more emphasis should be 
placed on the effort to control inflationary 
expectations and/or on the behaviour and 
evolution of money substitutes. 
This was followed by an analysis of the 
implications of a process of opening up to the 
exterior which occurred at a rate and with 
characteristics which were different in the real 
sector from those in the financial sector of the 
economy. 
An attempt was made to demonstrate the 
close relationship between exchange, mone-
tary and fiscal and credit policies in a process of 
this type. In particular, stress was laid on the 
need to pay greater attention to the composi-
tion of the balance of payments, in addition to 
its level; and mention was made of the dual role 
of the exchange rate, both as regards the trade 
balance and through the effects of expectations 
concerning its future evolution on interna-
tional capital movements. 
An analysis was then made of the justifica-
tion —based on counter-inflationary arguments 
and considerations relating to external bor-
rowing— given for the decision to carry out the 
external financial opening up in a relatively 
slow manner. It was indicated that, while such 
arguments are not without validity, they would 
carry greater weight if the commercial opening 
up had also been carried out more gradually; at 
all events, the magnitude of the inflow of 
external capital, and the way in which it was 
restricted, are highly disputable. 
A faster planned devaluation, together 
with a form of domestic credit management 
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designed to reduce the spread between 
interest rates to borrowers and to lenders, and 
an effort to quantify and take appropriate action 
on the demand for nominal money flow, might 
have led to a monetary situation such that, 
without generating inflationary pressures, 
publ ic sector expenditure and investment 
would have been spared such drastic reduc-
tions. 
The mechanisms used to control the flow 
of capital do not appear to have been those best 
suited to promoting greater investment or 
employment or the optimum allocation of 
resources. 
An estimate was made of the total transfers 
obtained by the domestic private sector which 
had access to external credit, and stress was laid 
on their important redistributive consequen-
ces, both within the private sector and vis-à-vis 
the public sector. 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that 
the maeroeconomic policy applied was not 
neutral with regard to the sectors and groups 
which had to bear not only the cost arising from 
the stabilization policy, but also the redistribu-
tive effects associated with the particular form 
in which the external financial opening up 
occurred. 
It seems clear that, on the basis of criteria 
of efficiency and equity, a government tax 
equivalent to a tariff on the import of external 
credit is a more appropriate mechanism for 
controlling external financial opening up than 
the introduction of quantitative restrictions. 
Such restrictions might become more impor-
tant if it is felt that the supply of international 
liquidity available to a country is very eratic or 
unstable. Indeed, this latter consideration, 
together with the speed of adjustment of capital 
movements compared with that of goods, 
suggests that the external financial opening up 
offers greater difficulties for the management 
of maeroeconomic policy than the commercial 
opening up. 
Finally, if it is decided to reform the 
external sector of the economy, the commercial 
and the financial opening up must be analysed, 
assessed and implemented in a co-ordinated 
manner. 
